2021 CHAMPIONS LEAGUE FINAL - PREVIEW

W e love nothing better than to refer to encounters between 'enlightened' coaches as chess matches. Cliché perhaps but how does one describe an encounter between the epitome of 'coached' teams - sides which have been carefully constructed and had every iota of quality squeezed out of them by their respective managers.

Soon after embarking upon his coaching journey Tuchel was swiftly pronounced as the 'German Guardiola'. In imitation of the great Spaniard, he too loved to dominate with the ball and for his teams to paint pretty canvasses in possession. He too would tinker profusely with his shape in order to achieve that objective in any given game. He too threw off the shackles of the restrictive 4-3-3 and pursued fluidity as a means to dominating the narrative for any given game. Possession was king.

Yet... we find both men here, at the summit of the European game in 2021 with their worst possession % statistics in recent memory. Chelsea's average of 59% under Tuchel is his lowest in the past 4 seasons of management, as is Guardiola's paltry 63% - representing a drop of 3% and 7% respectively. For coaches as highly analytical as these two, this is no accident. Both men have had to evolve their philosophy and become more versatile to remain ahead of the pack.

Which is what makes this match utterly fascinating and a genuine chess match, with an array of tactics and strategies almost certainly to be deployed. Analysts the world over are scratching their heads trying to predict their approaches for this encounter. No doubt they will also be struggling trying to keep up with all the in game tactical changes in real time once the whistle blows. Despite the daunting task ahead of us, we urge you to strap on your seatbelt and enjoy our attempt to forecast Saturday's finale.

BLUE MOON RISES HIGHER - BACK TO THE FUTURE

When Jose Manuel Lillo took over the assistant coach job left vacant by Mikel Arteta, it signalled the club's unwavering faith in their manager and the dawn of a new age. Lillo was a failure of a manager whose brightest moment in management was ultimately a loss, when his Real Oviedo side, the second biggest team in the Principality of Asturias, welcomed Bobby Robson’s Barcelona to the old Estadio Carlos Tartiere on the opening day of the 1996/1997 season.

With Hristo Stoichkov and a 19-year-old Ronaldo lining up for the visitors, it was Lillo’s side who claimed most of the plaudits despite the 2-4 loss. As Lillo readied himself for the post-match team talk, he heard a knock on the door. The visitor? none other than the esteemed captain of FC Barcelona... a certain Pep Guardiola, who wasted no time in conveying his adoration for how Lillo had put his team together and that he would like to stay in touch.

After an aborted attempt to run Barcelona together (with Lillo as head coach and Pep as Director) did not reach fruition, the next time Guardiola and Lillo touched base was in Mexico, more specifically Sinaloa... hometown of drug cartel leader Joaquín Guzmán, better known by his alias, ‘El Chapo’. Guardiola was in the final vestiges of his playing career and had been approached by Lillo to play under him for Dorados de Sinaloa. Instead of playing, Guardiola spent most of his time taking out his notepad and observing Lillo's training sessions. The rest is history.

Which brings us neatly to the modern day. Out from the wilderness, Lillo the nomad was brought in to serve as Guardiola's assistant at one of the leading clubs in world football. Eyebrows were initially raised when the new season began with a few hiccups and the Citizens were languishing midtable, but slowly and surely the principles of change began to work in an environment that dearly needed it.

With the loss of David Silva and the increased need to utilise Ilkay Gundogan in his absence - Lillo who was admired for his stylish use of the 4-2-3-1 in his heyday - was the perfect coach to implement this system (amongst others which make use of a double pivot) in a beautiful manner befitting a Pep Guardiola project. A far cry from the dour 4-2-3-1's we have been accustomed to seeing from the likes of Jose Mourinho or Ole Gunnar Solskjaer.

MANCHESTER CITY TACTICAL FRAMEWORK

OFFENSIVE TACTICS AND STRATEGY

No Striker, No Problem

Throughout his coaching career, Pep has not necessarily played classic positions or roles. His use of centre forwards have generally felt more like an afterthought, with the emphasis instead on free roaming attackers with mobility and whom possess the capacity to get involved in the build up. Messi at Barcelona was the embodiment of this philosophy and turned the world upside down when he played a deeper more productive style that got involved with team build up before ending in the danger zone to finish the move himself.

Pre and post Messi, Pep has generally tended to play with centre forwards but one suspects it never really sat naturally with him. How envious he must have felt when seeing Firmino line up for rivals Liverpool and become the flagbearer for the False 9 position for the past 5 years. Quite frankly he could have done with a Karim Benzema leading the line for this Manchester City outfit over the supremely gifted but not quite his cup of tea.... Sergio Aguero.

Alas it was not to be but this season the sustained injuries to Sergio Aguero played into Guardiola's hands. Suddenly he did not need to fit in a striker for the big games and thus he could go back to his tried and tested method in the big games, flood the midfield by deploying a False 9. Hence we have seen a preference for silky wide attacking midfielders such as Foden, Silva and KDB all feature as False 9's during City's run to the final.

Historically Pep does not play a classic #10 (well positionally anyway). His main director has to be part of the midfield rather than a floater/roamer off it. This is why when he came to the blue half of Manchester there were no roaming free roles for David Silva or Kevin De Bruyne. Instead they tucked in alongside Fernandinho giving passing options to their respective flanks with outside forwards in the form of Sane and Sterling respectively. Positionally both Silva and De Bruyne were #8's playing as #10 on each side of the field. They were not allowed to move inside.

The departure of Silva represented a problem. For the average fan, it seemed a common sense solution to put in Foden as a direct replacement for Silva or even Bernardo Silva. Pep did try that - he used Foden and De Bruyne together against Leeds, for portions of the infamous 5-2 loss to Leicester and Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne in a shock defeat to Mourinho's Tottenham Hotspurs. It did not work... they did not have the two-way positional nous of David Silva, they were not able to knit the midfield in the same way and City lacked the same control in their play.

Which brings us back to the role of Lillo and Gundogan. Behind the scenes there was a decision made to shift to a 4-2-3-1 and for more responsibility to be afforded to the German. Gundogan had been a 6.5/10 player for Manchester City. A passive player who ever since his back injury at Dortmund, never quite lived up to his potential. At one stage, it genuinely looked like he was the successor to the likes of Xavi and a competitor to the likes of Modric and Verratti... but in the blue of Manchester, there was a struggle to recall a performance of note.

Despite Pep's reservations, Gundogan started during the 5-0 win at Burnley and from thereon in, he never left the side. So what made this season different? Well for one, Gundogan was moving better than he had for years. He looked a man who had finally thrown off the effects of the back injury, the nimbleness in possession had returned and suddenly he could demand the ball in pressure situations and trust that he could protect it. This gave him the confidence to be riskier with the ball. It also gave him the confidence to break into enemy territory, with the belief he could make recovery runs if City lost possession.

The resurgence of Gundogan gave Pep's side the balance it desperately craved since the departure of Silva. In fact it made this City side more 'solid' than it had ever been albeit in truth it was not quite as easy on the eye as those original Pep sides. Eventually a role was found for Foden, down the left hand side and who knows, one day he may move into that Silva role but Pep correctly identified that he is too naïve in a defensive sense at this stage of his career to make it work.

The use of the inverted wing back is not new. It is definitely not very common. You need a certain skill set to carry it out. Paul Breitner did it for Bayern and Germany, Juan Pablo Sorin used to do it effortlessly for Bielsa and Pekerman. Phillip Lahm perfected the role under Pep at Bayern. And here at City, this season, we saw the emergence of Cancelo who at one stage was being asked to play explicitly in centre midfield in a 3-4-1-2.

He may have fallen out of favour by the time of writing this preview but no one can dispute his impact on City's journey this season. His ability to come off the wing and form part of the midfield when City were camped in the opposition half breathed new life into De Bruyne, who was able to throw off the shackles of being confined to the right hand side of the pitch. It also gave Gundogan licence to get forward, knowing that both Rodri and Cancelo were acting as the backboard for ball recycling.

DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND STRATEGY

To press or not to press

It is no secret that Pep or any modern manager tends to struggle past the third season. For Pep one of the major factors has been his commitment to the high press which ends up sapping his players of the energy needed to produce 5-7 seasons of sustained success that one associates with the likes of Manchester United under Sir Alex Ferguson.

Pep was all too aware of this but at the same time, he did not quite know how to produce a team any other way. If his team did not win the ball back as quickly, how would they ensure complete domination of the ball? would that invite more attacks on their goal? Again that shift to a double pivot and the introduction of Gundogan enabled a change of shape off the ball. City could defend in a 4-4-1-1, with De Bruyne not having to work as hard as Gundogan dropped alongside Rodri. This meant City would be difficult to play through even if not actively engaging the team in possession.

The other important factor in the successful execution of this rather conservative strategy was the introduction of Ruben Dias. His ability to deal with aerial bombardment meant that City were happy to at times sit off and invite crosses or long balls into the box, knowing that their defender had the edge. Pep now had the confidence that his men would not be found wanting if they did not have the ball.

The English Contingent

Much has been spoken about in regards to the revival of John Stones. Less has been spoken about the performance of Kyle Walker in the latter half of the season, who has eradicated the brain farts which so often plagued his game during the crunch moments of the season. Why have these two immensely talented yet gaffe prone defenders proven to be so solid this season?

Again this leads back to the more conservative strategy deployed by Pep. The weakened commitment to the high press has meant City can defend 10 yards deeper which protects defenders from being exposed for marginal positional errors in a high line. Furthermore the 4-4-1-1 shape off the ball means there is two midfielders protecting the central areas which again gives the centre backs an extra layer of protection. So whilst these defenders may have individually improved to a degree, the protection they are receiving is greater.

A SERIES OF FORTUNATE EVENTS

With the Blue side of London, things are very unpredictable to say the least. The last time Chelsea sacked their manager mid season, Roberto De Matteo took over and against all odds, the London side won the Champions league beating favourites Bayern Munchen in their home turf. If we look at the moments leading up to Thomas Tuchel's arrival, there is a series of similar events that cannot be ignored. And if that is the case, then some very superstitious fans would take that as a sign of things (positive things) to come (or repeat).

It was clear from the off this season that something was not quite right at Chelsea. An influx of new signings put almighty pressure on Frank Lampard to deliver silverware. He had built a fine tuned side last season which was in truth lacking stardust but it was neat and easy on the eye. Questions have to be asked as to how many of the new signings were actually made with his approval as he seemed totally confused as to how to use them... the German's Werner and Havertz posed more problems than they provided answers.

Fortunately for Abrahmovic, the perfect manager to resolve the 'German Conundrum' came on to the market just as rumours began to circulate about Lampard's departure. As is the Chelsea way, they did not hesitate to pull the trigger and almost instantaneously Chelsea began to look a serious side under Tuchel. Pieces which looked liked odd parts in Lampard's ill-fated rigid 4-3-3 suddenly began to look like the perfect solutions in a myriad of formations under Tuchel who would eventually settle on a 3-4-2-1.

CHELSEA TACTICAL FRAMEWORK

OFFENSIVE TACTICS AND STRATEGY

Wandering Werner

One of the biggest issues that Lampard had was how to deal with 'Turbo Timo'. Werner had come to prominence as a Left Wing Forward/Second Striker in a 3-4-2-1 system in RB Leipzig and what that system afforded him was the chance to focus on making darting runs in the left half space channel between the RB and RCB. His participation in the build up was minimal and very rarely did he need to dribble against a full back 1 v 1.

Contrast that to his role under Lampard where he was stuck out on the left flank as an inverted winger, often facing 2 v 1 situations or at best being asked to weave a full back up in knots. He simply didn't have the footwork to make such a role work and he often had to pass the ball back or side ways with no real space to go into. Tactically it was a mess and it explains why Werner struggled so much with confidence earlier in the season.

Tuchel grasped this issue straight away and that is why he made the decision to play with wing backs. They would take care of the width and that would free up Timo to play closer to goal and get back into running the half space channels. Such has been the impact of this decision, Werner has been a driving force in Chelsea finishing top 4, becoming FA finalists and potentially winning the Champions League.

Sorting Out The Midfield

The shift away from the 4-3-3 also brought to life the midfield which often looked laboured and uncomfortable under Lampard's management. Jorginho looked vulnerable as the CDM in English football lacking the industry to protect the back four in such a frenetic league. Kante whose game revolved around storming the opposition and nicking the ball before flying forward in transition was now expected to play in a more considered manner more befitting a 3 man midfield - which negated his strengths and made him half the player.

By having 5 defenders around them, Jorginho could revel in just focus on building up play in deeper areas and Kante was now freed up to be a 'ball winner' rather than defence protector. He is more of a 'Gattuso' rather than a Rijkaard, a pitbull of a player and again Tuchel illustrated how his understanding of the nuances of the game was on another planet to the inexperienced Lampard. It is no coincidence that the Frenchman was man of the match in both matches against Real Madrid.

Another important player in the middle of the park is Mateo Kovacic. Up and until his injury, Kovacic was a main stay in centre midfield. His playmaking skills were crucial in building his sides possession and his quick feet meant the opposition could not take the ball of him either. That sense of unpredictability would clearly tip crucial encounters in Chelsea's favour. It remains to be seen what midfield combination Tuchel opts for.

Havertz as a False 9

Whilst Werner has been successfully integrated within the first team, the other German... Kai Havertz, has yet to find his feet under Tuchel. There has been glimpses of a revival and this has usually been as the centre forward or more accurately the false 9 in Tuchel's set up. We have seen recently how when Tuchel opted to deploy Werner as the central striker that Chelsea came undone. His lack of hold up play, predictability when not allowed to run the channels was uneasy to witness.

Yet we saw how devastating Havertz 2.0 can be in the central areas when he was unleashed against Real Madrid. His performance was reminiscent of Mario Kempes during the 1978 World Cup, dropping into the midfield and then driving with the ball, holding it up when need be, running the channel and playing in runners. An aerial threat in the box who can make use of the wing backs delivery. A must if Chelsea want to give the likes of Stones and Dias a run for their money.

DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND STRATEGY

A Story of Left v Right (Wing Backs)

In order for this system to work, Tuchel has relied heavily on Ben Chilwell to hold the width down the left flank and bomb forward at every given opportunity. On the other flank, Tuchel has tinkered heavily depending on the game situation, the opponent and form of his respective players. If he wants to attack down both flanks relentlessly, he will bring on Hudon-Odoi down the right often against the low block or in desperate times. If he is looking for a fairly attacking line up but from the first minute, he has tended to opt for Reece James.

However in the big games... Tuchel has taken everyone by surprise by opting for the veteran Cesar Azpilicueta as the right wing back. This has been a very defensive move but it has reaped its reward in the Champions League where teams have really struggled to make any headway down that flank thus forcing them to gamble and attack Chilwell... which then opens up spaces in their right flank for Chilwell and Werner to hit on the counter.

Ohhhh Thiago Silva

Back to back finals for the Brazilian. A remarkable achievement for a man who looks so physically diminished in contrast to his prime... quite how he is doing it is beyond the realms of this analyst but doing it he is. It does help that he is playing in a back 3 which is quite tight knit. Furthermore the introduction of Azpi as a right wing back has meant that the defence can shift across if Chilwell is out of position which means Rudiger goes into left back and essentially it means that the areas Silva has to defend are small. It is less taxing on his legs and he is less likely to be as exposed as under Lampard.

HOW WILL THE GAME PAN OUT?

Whilst it is difficult to pin point the exact team selections of both sides, we can assume that City will probably have the edge in terms of ball retention and that their midfield will almost certainly contain Gundogan, De Bruyne and Foden. The big question is whether Pep opts for Fernandinho or Rodri in the CDM position. With the Brazilian he will have more progression from deeper areas but he risks his side being caught out on the counter...Mount and Havertz in particular could exploit this, seeing as they gave Casemiro a run for his money.

Another key battle is Werner against Kyle Walker and John Stones. In theory, Walker is the ideal match up to keep Werner quiet as he has the pace to negate Werner's greatest strength but will Walker fall back into his old ways and make a positional brainfart on the biggest stage? This is a big test for the English pair who if they pass this test will fancy their chances of starring at Euro 2020 but it is a crucial area on the pitch. Hard to imagine Chelsea winning unless Werner is effective.

Mahrez v Chilwell - is another riveting battle if the Algerian gets picked. This is the flank where Chelsea could find themselves vulnerable but I expect to see Tuchel prohibit Chilwell from going too gung ho in the opening periods to frustrate CIty effectively making it a back 5 before unleashing him once the game is poised, and using the shifting across of the backline and Rudiger at LB. Mahrez does not deliver often enough in these big games since arriving at City so this is a massive test of his credentials.

Another question for Pep to answer is does he go with the double false 9 of De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva? or a single false 9 or does he go with Gabriel Jesus? History suggests that when the stakes are higher Pep tends to avoid using a striker and focus on controlling the game as much as possible. History also suggests that when he takes this route, his teams invariably do well. He tends to suffer more when his side is forced to field an orthodox striker but is that the right approach to take against a Chelsea side which will be hard to break down?

Finally who Pep picks at left wing back is also key. If he goes with Cancelo, it will mean his side will dominate the narrative of the game in terms of possession but it could also mean that Azpilicueta has a rather easy game of it down the right with little thrust coming down that flank. On the other hand, if Pep picks Zinchenko it means that his side can stretch the pitch more and Chelsea will have larger spaces to defend. Playing Zinchenko and then starting Jesus might be a way of exploiting Thiago Silva's lack of legs.

THE PYTHAGORAS PERSPECTIVE

Manchester City: Ederson, John Stones, Ruben Dias, K. Walker, Zinchenko, Rodri, B. Silva, Gundogan, Foden, Mahrez, De Bruyne

Chelsea: Mendy, Rudiger, Thiago Silva, Christensen, Azpilicueta, Chilwell, Jorginho, N. Kante, Mason Mount, T. Werner, K. Havertz

The first team line ups can be considered nothing more than speculation since both coaches have a history of chopping and changing in an attempt to surprise their opposition. Both coaches will have a fit squad to choose from and even though there are one or two key players struggling to get match fit, their condition will be monitored till the last minute before the final line ups are decided.

Speaking of which, some players will have a good chance of staking a claim for a place in the starting line up. Tuchel might sacrifice Timo Werner and play Pulisic on top with support coming from Ziyech and Mount. This would allow him more control on possession. Pep on the other hand will wait for the fitness calls on both his key midfielders Kevin De Bruyne and Ilkay Gundogan.

We can expect a very close encounter. Do not be surprised if the score line stays 0-0 or 1-1 even after extra time. Both coaches know each other and have played twice already this season. There will be less in the way of surprises. Penalties might well be the deciding factor. The Citizens might well have the advantage in that department with Ederson having more experience in saving spot kicks. Chelsea might not be so lucky this time. Manchester City to win it on penalties.

Other Predictions

@CamH___ - City win convincingly. The past 13 years have been leading up to this moment. This current Chelsea side are not, on paper and in terms of form, better than this City side. Tuchel has been influential in improving Chelsea, but not enough to win them a Champions League.

@Vipul aka Sport Bar - If Chelsea scores first (I think if they do and then it would be before 20 minutes) then City would win 2-1 in ET. If City scores first then also City will win, but 2-0 with second goal coming late after 75 minutes.

CO-WRITTEN BY RAEES MAHMOOD AND DR. AMER WASEEM (FT. CAMERON, VIPUL AND JUAN CARLOS)